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The recent round of Canadian constitutional reform has spawned 
a veritable flood of legal and political commentary. For students of 
Canadian affairs grappling with this ever-growing body of literature, 
And No One Cheered stands out as essential reading. This collection 
of seventeen essays cuts through much of the rhetoric and posturing 
surrounding the reform process to give an incisive and 
uncompromising analysis of the struggle and its outcome. The 
contributors approach the events they describe from widely different 
and often conflicting perspectives. Yet they all seem agreed in their 
verdict on Canada's constitutional labors: this moment in the nation's 
collective history has been a time of lost opportunities and shattered 
illusions rather than of vision and rebirth. Canadians had an 
unprecedented opportunity to restructure and revitalize their 
constitutional arrangements, but their political elites allowed the 
opportunity to slip through their fingers. Not only have Canada's 
underlying political tensions remained unresolved but, arguably, they 
have been exacerbated by the bitterness and polarization created by 
the reform process. 
The first group of essays in the volume examines the 
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constitutional reform process from the perspective of federalism. 
The institutions of federal government are an attempt to 
accommodate the two great cleavages in the Canadian polity: 
dualism and regionalism. As the introductory essay by Banting and 
Simeon argues, these cleavages have generated two starkly 
contrasting visions of the nature of the Canadian community.1 
Dualism contrasts an image of Canada as two distinct societies or 
nations with a second image of Canada as a single, bilingual unit. 
Regionalism expands and develops this contrast in background 
conceptions. It sees Canada either as a collection of regional 
communities or as a unified polity that is more than the sum of its 
parts. The authors of the first group of essays argue that the 
constitutional Accord2 failed to reconcile or transcend these 
contradictory visions of the country. Instead, it was a "blunt and 
brutal compromise"3 which, at best, will provide only a temporary 
ceasefire in the relentless intergovernmental war. 
The most negative and angry response comes from the four 
Quebecers in this first group. Their essays begin with the 
assumption that the distinctive national character of Quebec 
society requires an expansion of the constitutional authority of 
the Quebec government. They regard the constitutional Accord as 
a betrayal of that vision of Canada. Particularly important is the 
essay by Daniel Latouche.4 Although Latouche is fired by a sense 
of outrage at the "constitutional mouse" delivered by the "federal-
provincial mountain," his essay offers analysis as well as emotion. 
In particular he argues that Quebecers must share part of the 
blame for their fate. Quebec's political leaders since 1960 have been 
unable to agree on a constitutional strategy and pursue it 
effectively. Instead, they have been obsessed with negotiation: 
"one partner wanted to negotiate without necessarily reaching 
agreement, while the other would have liked to reach an agreement 
without negotiation" (p. 98). In this ambiguity lay the seeds of a 
constitutional "hijacking." The essay by Gerard Bergeron5 is less 
successful. Like Latouche, Bergeron articulates forcefully Quebec's 
disillusionment with federalism following its exclusion from the 
constitutional Accord of November 1981. Yet Bergeron makes little 
attempt to analyze this process or its implications for Quebec. He 
contents himself with simply recounting the reactions of 
Quebecers and justifying the tactics and the policies of the 
Levesque government. Bergeron finds it necessary to reassure his 
confused readers that "the experience of Quebecers is not as 
dramatic as that of the Poles, that Trudeau has not imposed the 
same fate on Levesque as Jaruzelski has on Lech Walesa" (p. 67). 
In contrast, Roger Gibbins' perceptive essay is written from a 
pan-Canadian perspective.6 Gibbins regards the erosion of federal 
institutions and political authority as the great crisis of Canadian 
federalism. The unrepresentative character of our national political 
institutions has produced strong sentiments for reform in Western 
Canada. Yet the West has been unable to generate any coherent, 
alternative vision of how the country ought to function. Instead, 
the articulation of Western discontent has been monopolized by 
provincial premiers whose uppermost concern has been to 
preserve their own prerogatives and power. In Gibbins' view, a 
succession of Western premiers has been far more interested in 
minor refinements to the existing system that would safeguard 
provincial power rather than in fundamental reform. Thus, 
paradoxically, instead of generating impetus for change, the alienated 
West has assumed a "largely defensive posture, protecting an 
institutional status quo that should not have been defended, not in its 
present form, and not by the West" (p. 122). Gibbins sees the main 
failing of the Constitution Act, 1982 as its strengthening of the 
position of Western Canadian provincial governments. The Act 
confirms the proposition that "the constitution is the property and 
prerogative of governments rather than the people governments 
represent" (p. 127). Gibbins' great strength is his ability to overcome 
the pervasive tendency to identify existing patterns of hierarchy or 
privilege as natural or inevitable forms of social oranization.7 
The second section of the volume is comprised of essays 
analyzing the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
constitutional reform process. The authors of these essays regard 
the historic judgment of 28 September 19818 as one of the most 
important ever delivered by the Court. William Lederman's essay9 
adopts an avowedly realist stance. He argues that the majority and 
minority judgments in the case are explicable only in terms of the 
judges' contrasting conceptions of the nature of Canadian federalism. 
In his view, this follows from the fact that, although the various 
judges were reading the same constitutional history and 
precedents, they came to radically different conclusions on the legal 
issues. Unfortunately, though, Lederman's analysis raises more 
questions than it answers. If the essence of constitutional 
adjudication consists of asking jurists to elaborate their beliefs about 
the nature of Canadian federalism, how does this process differ 
from political reasoning in general? Moreover, why should choices 
of this type be the preserve of an unrepresentative group of elite 
lawyers? 10 Lederman does not resolve these underlying problems.11 
Noting that the judgments of the court were thorough and 
scholarly, he concludes that "authoritative judicial review is alive 
and well and living in Canada" (p. 187). 
Peter Russell is more critical of the Court's performance. 12 He 
rejects the Court's view that constitutional conventions are in no 
sense part of constitutional law. But, Russell argues, once the Court 
accepted this stark distinction, it should have refused to answer the 
reference question dealing with constitutional conventions. If there 
is, in fact, a wide gulf separating law from convention, the court was 
simply engaging in politics by rendering a decision on the 
conventional issue. As such, Russell regards the court's judgment 
as lacking intellectual coherence. 
The final group of essays examines the reform process from the 
perspective of democracy. The theme running through these essays is 
the weak nature of Canada's commitment to any thorough-going 
form of. popular sovereignty. The recent process of constitutional 
reform reveals Canadian politics to be a "process of democratic 
elitism tempered by occasional populist anger."13 The most 
prominent exposition of this argument is the essay by Reginald 
Whitaker.14 He suggests that Canadian politics has always been 
an elite affair; the primary role of the constitution having been to 
maintain peace between governments rather than between 
government and the people. Whitaker sees the roots of this elitist 
tradition in the eighteenth century British doctrine that sovereignty 
lies in the Crown-in-Parliament, as opposed to the people 
themselves. In his analysis of the most recent reform episode, 
Whitaker sees faint indications that Canadians were prepared to 
break with these anti-democratic assumptions. He suggests that 
there were some significant aspects of the original federal proposals 
which did recognize elements of popular sovereignty. But these 
democratic elements were vigorously attacked and eventually 
eradicated. In this way, "Canadian traditions were preserved" (p. 
260). 
The verdict of these essays is harsh, but not unfair. They 
deserve to be read not just by professional students of Canadian 
affairs, but by the general Canadian public. Anyone who does so 
will come away with the conviction that more meaningful 
constitutional reform is imperative in the near future. The issue, 
of course, is whether such change is still possible. Most of these 
essayists seem to believe that the political elites, as well as the 
citizenry, have been exhausted by the long years of constitutional 
wrangling and now wish to deal with other matters. It is almost as 
if the incumbents of privilege, having beaten back the forces for 
change, have become impregnable. .But this view is mistaken, 
reflecting the "dark fatalism which bids men regard themselves as 
the sport of fate, their conditions beyond curing, their lot one to 
endure."15 This fatalism is only necessary or inevitable if Canadians 
choose to make it so. The lost opportunities of 1982 need not 
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